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Schneebeck: Constitutional Law - Religious Freedom and Public Land Use -Wilso

CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Religious Freedom and Public Land Use. Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The Navajo Indians believe the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona are
a living deity and pray directly to them.' The mountains are the Hopi
religion's most sacred shrine 2 and the home of the Creator's emissaries
to mankind.' For centuries both tribes collected sacred medicines and performed religious ceremonies on the Peaks.4
Comprising an area of 75,000 acres, the Peaks are located in the
Coconino National Forest and are managed by the United States Forest
Service.5 In 1937, a private corporation developed 777 acres of the Peaks
as a downhill ski area known as the Snow Bowl.6 In 1977, the ski area
operator submitted a plan for future development of the Snow Bowl to
the Forest Service, proposing to clear an additional 120 acres of forest
for new ski runs, construct new facilities, upgrade existing structures, and
improve the Snow Bowl road.'
The Forest Service identified six alternatives to the operator's plan.'
These included removing all artificial structures from the Peaks, allowing full development proposed by the ski area operator,' or continuing
operation of the ski area with minimum change." In 1979, the Forest Service issued a permit allowing limited development of the Snow Bowl under
a "preferred alternative" which had not been identified in the draft environmental impact statement."
The Navajo Medicinemen's Association and the Hopi Indian Tribe
sued the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chief Forester of the Forest Service, the United States Forest Service, and the United States, seeking
to halt further development of the area and to remove existing facilities
at the Snow Bowl. 2 The Indians claimed development of the area would
profane the Peaks, dilute the Peaks' healing power, and offend the
Creator. 3 Disrupting the use of the Peaks for prayer, religious ceremonies,
1. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3074 ID.D.C. 1981), afrd sub. norm, Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied in part, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983), cert. denied
inpart, 104 S. Ct. 739 J1984).
2. Brief for Appellant Hopi Indian Tribe at 3, Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983) (hereinafter Hopi Brief].
3. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 738.
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Id In addition to the ski area, structures such as natural gas, electrical and telephone
lines were on the Peaks. Cinder extraction and mining was conducted on the Peaks for thirty years prior to the instant litigation. Id at 745 n.6.
7. Id at 739.
8. Id at 738. These alternatives were identified pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
9. Id
10. Hopi Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
11. The acreage was reduced from 120 acres to 50. Expansion and upgrading of the
facilities was authorized. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 739.
12. Id
13. Id

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 20 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 5
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XX

and the collection of sacred objects, the Indians argued, violated their first
amendment right to free exercise of religion.14
The suits were consolidated with a complaint brought by Mr. and Mrs.
Wilson, owners of a local ranch. 15 Cross-motions for summary judgment
were filed, and the district court granted summary judgment to the
government. 6
The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, affirmed the lower court.'7 The court held that plaintiffs seeking to restrict
uses of public land in the name of religious freedom must show that the
government's proposed land use impairs a religious practice which can
not be performed at any other site.'
BACKGROUND

Free Exercise of Religion
The first amendment enjoins Congress from making laws "respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 9 A
two part analysis determines whether governmental action impermissibly
restricts religious tenets."0 First, the challenged regulation must burden
religion. Second, the government must fail to show a compelling interest
justifying the impediment.
The party asserting a free exercise violation must demonstrate that
the challenged regulation burdens the practice of religion." In Wisconsin
v. Yoder,2 the Court held that beliefs, to be religious, must be sincere and
"rooted in religion," not merely matters of personal preference or life2
style. 1
The governmental action must have a coercive effect against the practice of religion.2 4 In Sherbert v. Verner,2 5 and Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security Division,2 6 the Court noted two ways
in which regulations impair religion. A direct burden compels a violation
of conscience"2 or regulates, prohibits, or rewards religious beliefs.28 An
14. Id. at 739-40.
15. Id. at 739. The district court ruled that Wilson did not have standing to assert the
Navajo and Hopi religious claims. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 740 n.1.
16. Id. at 739.
17. Id. at 760.
18. Id. at 744.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
20. Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785, 790 (D. S.D. 1982), a/f'd, 607 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983),
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 215-16.
Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 223.
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
McDaniel V. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
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enactment imposes an indirect burden if its purpose or effect impedes or
discriminates between religions."'
The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the objective
advanced by the regulation outweighs the abridged right.30 For example,
free exercise claims have been rejected when the challenged law regulates
conduct threatening public health or safety. 1 The government's need must
be compelling, 2 and only interests of the highest order can overcome
legitimate free exercise claims.3 Even if the interest is compelling, an
enactment is invalid if it burdens religion more than necessary to achieve
the desired goal.'

Indian Free Exercise Claims
In a series of cases beginning in 1980, Native Americans challenged
public land uses on free exercise grounds. The courts, while generally
recognizing the sincerity of the religious claims, have refused to limit uses
of public land on the basis of first amendment religious rights.
In cases not relating to public lands, Native Americans asserted first
amendment protection of traditional religious practices in People v.
Woody 8 and Frank v. State.3 6 In Woody, a Navajo Indian was convicted
for using the drug peyote during a religious ceremony. 37 On appeal, the
court held that the first amendment protected Woody's use of peyote for
religious purposes. 8 The court found that peyote played a central role in
the defendant's religion,3 9 and that it was an object of worship to which
the defendant prayed.40 The religion could not be practiced without
peyote. 4' Criminal sanctions prohibiting the use of peyote inhibited the
defendant's practice of religion. Because the state's interest did not
4
43
outweigh the first amendment right, the conviction was reversed.
An Athabascan Indian was convicted of transporting a moose killed
out of season in Frank. The meat was used in a funeral potlatch for a
29. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
30. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
32. Id.
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
34. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. at 718.
35. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
36. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
37. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 717, 394 P.2d at 814-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 70-71. (At
trial the defendant contended his use of peyote was religious and prosecution would abridge
his free exercise rights).
38. Id. at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
39. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
40. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
41. Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
42. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
43. Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
44. Id. at 728, 394 P.2d at 822, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
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member of the tribe who died.' 5 The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed
the conviction." The court first determined the ceremony was a religious
practice. 7 The potlatch was the most important institution of the
Athabascan religion.41 Although the court disagreed with the lower court's
finding that moose was not essential to the ceremony, it held that absolute
necessity is not required for a belief to acquire first
amendment protec49
tion, if the practice is deeply rooted in religion.
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority" was the first case brought
by Native Americans challenging public land use on free exercise grounds.
Cherokee Indians sought to prevent completion of a dam which would
flood sites of religious significance.5' The court of appeals affirmed a
district court ruling granting the Authority's motion to dismiss.2 Relying on Yoder, Woody, and Frank, it held that the Cherokees had failed
to demonstrate an infringement of a first amendment right. The court
held that to state such a claim requires a showing that worship at a site
is inseparable from a traditional way of life, is a cornerstone of religious
5
observance, or plays a central role in religious ceremonies and practices. '
Granting that the Indians sincerely adhered to their religion, the court
concluded the Indians' claims were personal preferences rather than convictions shared by an organized group, and that the element of centrality
55
or indispensability of the area as a place of worship was missing.5 6
Medicines collected in the valley could be obtained at other locations.
The area was not used for religious purposes by Cherokees other than the
plaintiffs." Concluding that a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion had not been shown, the court did not examine whether the
Authority's interest was compelling. 8
Subsequent cases underscored the reluctance to accept Indian free exercise claims asserting the right to control public lands. These cases focused on the conflicting interests in access to public lands. Two questions
45. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d at 1069. The lower court found the ceremony was an integral part of the Athabascan religion, and that the defendant's beliefs were sincere, but
that moose was not specifically required for the potlatch. Thus, the court reasoned, the defendant was not denied his religious rights.
46. Id at 1070.
47. Id at 1072.
48. Id at 1071.
49. Id at 1072-73. The court held that the competing state interest was strong but
not compelling. Questioning whether the state's interest would suffer from an exemption
to the game laws, the court concluded that the burden of showing a compelling interest had
not been met by the state. Id at 1074.
50. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
51. Id at 1160.
52. Id. at 1164. The lower court granted the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs
lacked a property interest in the site. The court of appeals noted that this issue was not
dispositive of the case.
53. Id at 1165.
54. Id at 1164.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id at 1163.
58. Id at 1165.
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are involved. The first is whether government has denied access to sites
of worship, thus impairing the free exercise of religion. The second is
whether religious practitioners may restrict the public's access to public
land in the name of religion.
The plaintiffs in Badoni v. Higginson9 sought to enjoin the Bureau
of Reclamation from flooding a sacred site in Rainbow Bridge National
Monument and to order the National Park Service to regulate tourists
at the Monument to prevent its desecration."° The court of appeals first
held that the government's interest in water storage outweighed the Indians' religious claims and upheld the decision not to enjoin flooding of
the site.6 Next the court affirmed denial of an injunction to prevent
tourists from desecrating the site and interfering with the Indians'
religious ceremonies. It concluded that this form of relief would violate
the establishment clause, and the government had a strong interest in
assuring public access to the National Monument. 2 The court held that
exercise of first amendment freedoms may not be used to deprive the
public of its normal use of an area.6 3 Finally, the court noted that the Indians had 6not
been denied access to the area to conduct religious
4
ceremonies.
In Crow v. Gullett,6 5 members of the Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations
attemped to halt construction of facilities and to remove roads, parking
lots, and buildings at Bear Butte State Park, South Dakota.6 The Indians
claimed that construction projects denied them access to religious sites
and allowed tourists to interfere with religious ceremonies. The court found
no infringement on the first amendment, because the Indians' right of
access was restricted only temporarily by the construction projects. 67 The
court concluded that the free exercise clause forbids prohibiting religious69
acts, but does not require states to provide the means to carry them out.
In Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 69 the Inupiat people challenged an oil exploration lease granted by the United
59. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
60. Id. at 176.

61. Id at 177. The district court ruled against the plaintiffs because they had no property interest. The court of appeals, however, concluded that management of public lands
must not offend the Constitution. Id at 176.
62. Id at 178.
63. Id at 179. The court relied on Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 159
(1969) for the proposition that the first amendment may not be used to deny the public of
its normal use of an area. But see Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (1982), suggesting
that Shuttlesworth holds permit systems controlling public land uses unconstitutional when
they restrain first amendment rights without narrow, objective standards.
64. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d at 180.
65. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D. S.D. 1982), affld, 607 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 413 1983).
66. Id. at 788. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the United States
Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
67. Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
68. Id at 791.
69. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982).
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States to several oil companies." Claiming the lease denied them access
to sacred grounds, the Indians asserted a violation of the free exercise
clause.71 The court found that the lease did not seriously burden any
religious practice, since the Indians had not identified sites of worship
within the zone leased by the government. The court noted the establishment clause precluded granting the relief sought, since to do so would
create a religious sanctuary. 3 It held that a free exercise claim cannot4
be used to award religious groups exclusive rights to use a public area.
Completion of a road by the Forest Service into a sacred area was
found not to burden unduly Indians' free exercise rights in Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation v. Peterson.11The Indians claimed
the road would lead to increased use of the site by the public, resulting
in its desecration.7 1 The court decided that Indians must be allowed
reasonable access to public lands to conduct religious ceremonies, but that
government
is not required to restrict public access to facilitate those
77
purposes.
These cases examined the issue of whether Native Americans could
limit governmental actions on public land in the name of religious freedom.
The courts disposed of the issue by holding that the Indians had failed
to state cognizable free exercise claims. In Wilson v. Block,7 the court
followed this trend and summarized the federal courts' view of when the
first amendment limits public land uses.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The court in Wilson affirmed a district court ruling granting summary
judgment to the United States. 7 The lower court found that the decision
to expand the ski area did not deny the Navajo and Hopi plaintiffs access to the San Francisco Peaks, did not stop the Indians from gathering
sacred objects and conducting ceremonies on the Peaks, and did not prohibit the practice of their religion.8 0 Thus, the action did not burden the
plaintiffs' religious beliefs and practices.81 The district court concluded
that to enjoin expansion of the ski area and to order removal of the
70. Id at 185.
71. Id at 188.
72. Id at 188-89. The court held that the United States' interests in energy resources
and in treaty obligations outweighed the plaintiff's free exercise claims, even if a substantial burden on religion had been shown.
73. Id. at 189.
74. Id.

75. 552 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
76. Id at 954.
77. Id.

78. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied in part,104 S. Ct. 371 (1983), cert. denied
in part, 104 S. Ct. 739 (1984).
79. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 738.
80. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. at 3074-75.
81. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 740.
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existing facilities would violate the establishment clause by forcing the
government to manage the Peaks as a "religious shrine. "82
In upholding the decision, the court of appeals relied on the Supreme
Court's two-fold analysis for free exercise claims. 3 The parties stipulated
that the Indians' beliefs were religious and sincere, thus meeting the requirement that the beliefs be rooted in religion.4 The court noted that
a plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating an infringement of first
amendment rights" and held the Indians failed to make such a showing. 6
The court concluded that no burden was placed on the Indians' free
exercise of religion. No direct burden was found, since the government's
action did not regulate or prohibit the Indians' beliefs. The decision to
expand the ski area did not deny the Indians access to the San Francisco
Peaks. While the Peaks as a whole were indispensable to the Indians'
religions, the evidence failed to show the indispensability of the Snow Bowl
itself, because ceremonies and collection of sacred objects could take place
elsewhere.87
With regard to the existence of an indirect burden, the Indians argued
that expansion of the ski area would desecrate their most sacred shrine.
This, in turn, would impede their religious ceremonies, diminish their practices, and dilute their religious beliefs.8 The decision of the Forest Service burdened the Indians' religions by compelling them to abandon their
most sacred place or to modify their beliefs to conform to commercial
uses.89 The Indians argued that Sherbert0 and Thomas9 ' set the applicable
constitutional standard, and that these cases condemn any action which
encourages religious practitioners to modify their beliefs. 9 Seq uoyah, according to the Indians, misinterpreted the first amendment. All religious
practices, whether or not central to a religion, are protected.93
The court, however, found no indirect burden in the Forest Service's
decision to expand the ski area.94 The court interpreted Sherbert and
Thomas to hold only that government may not, by conditioning public
82. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. at 3075-76. The court of appeals did not address this issue. The establishment clause has, however, been used by other courts to deny
Indian free exercise claims. See supra text accompanying notes 62-73. In Yoder, the Court
specifically rejected the argument that relief under the free exercise clause would contravene
the establishment clause. It stated that accomodating religious beliefs is not sponsorship
of or active involvement with religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 n.22. See L. TRBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-4, at 821-22 (1978).
83. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 740.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id. at 745.
87. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Hopi Brief, supra note 2, at 15.
Id. at 26-27.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 741.

93. Id. at 743.

94. Id. at 741.
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benefits, penalize adherence to a religious belief. 95 The court, choosing to
follow its interpretation of Seq uoyah,6 held that no first amendment claim
has been stated if a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that public land is indispensable to some religious practice, whether or not central to a religion
itself.' Thus, the rule of law in Wilson is that plaintiffs seeking to restrict
the use of public land in the name of religion must show, at a minimum,
that the government's proposed land use impairs a religious practice which
can not be performed at any other site.9 8

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The result in Wilson is consistent with those in the cases preceding
it. The decision required that the land in question be the only place where
religious practices can be conducted before the first amendment controls
its use.99 The court relied on Sequoyah as precedent for its holding.'00 The
court in Sequoyah erred in two ways.
First, it misinterpreted Wisconsin v. Yoder.'0 Yoder did not require
that a religious practice be central to a religion in order to acquire first
amendment protection. 0 In Yoder, the issue was whether a belief was
in fact religious and therefore protected by the first amendment.103 The
Court held that beliefs are religious when they are "rooted in religion."
Indispensability is but one factor in determining whether a belief is rooted
in religion.? °
Second, the Sequoyah court used Frank v. State' as a basis for its
holding. The Frank court, however, observed that the absolute necessity
of a practice to a religion is not a requirement for first amendment protection. 06 Other courts have found that a belief rooted in religion is pro95. Id Where receipt of a benefit is conditioned upon conduct proscribed by a religious
belief, thus pressuring an adherent to violate his beliefs, a burden on religion exists. Thomas,
450 U.S. at 717-18.
96. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 743-44.
97. Id at 743.
98. Id
99. Id At the same time, some aspects of the court's decision were less restrictive than
earlier cases. The court in Wilson noted that the government's property interests and land
management duties do not outweigh the free exercise clause. Public lands must be managed
in a constitutional manner. The free exercise clause may control public land uses. Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d at 744.
100. Id at 743-44. The court maintained Sequoyah holds no first amendment claim is
stated if a plaintiff is unable to demonstrate public land is indispensable to some religious
practice, whether or not central to the religion. However, Sequoyah stated that a site must
be central to the religion, be a cornerstone of the religion, or play a central role in religious
ceremonies and practices. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
102. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d at 1164.
103. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
104. Id at 215.
105. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
106. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d at 1072-73.
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tected by the first amendment regardless of the importance of the
activity.' 7 Thus, Sequoyah arrived at its holding by misinterpreting precedent.
In a correct analysis, plaintiffs asserting that public land uses violate
the free exercise clause must show the abridged beliefs are rooted in
religion,'" and the government's land use has a coercive effect which
substantially burdens religion.' °9
In Wilson, the court recognized the validity and sincerity of the plaintiffs' religious beliefs." 0 Those beliefs are therefore entitled to first amendment protection."' The next question is whether the Indians' beliefs were
substantially burdened by the Forest Service. Absence of a direct burden
is only the beginning, not the end, of a proper analysis.'1 2 That the plaintiffs were not denied access to the San Francisco Peaks and that sacred
medicine was available at other locations is only one test of whether a
burden was placed on religion. Freedom of expression in an appropriate
place may not be abridged merely because it can be exercised elsewhere." 3
Absent a compelling interest, if the effect of the government's action
is to impede the practice of religion, it is invalid." 4 The district court found
that the Indians believe cutting, digging, and other disturbances by
humans cause the Deity to lose its power."15 The evidence showed that
the Peaks were indispensable to the Indians' religions." 6 The court held,
however, that because the Snow Bowl itself was not indispensable, the
Indians' free exercise rights had not been impeded. The court emphasized
that prior development had not prevented the Indians from engaging in
their religion," 7 despite their belief that development impaired the Peaks'
spiritual power."'
This attempt to reconcile the interests involved suffers from two flaws.
First, it ignores the fact that the Peaks were an object, as well as a place,
of worship."09 Second, this type of analysis places the court squarely in
the position of deciding what the plaintiffs believed. The United States
Supreme Court has held that courts are not competent to make determinations of religious orthodoxy.' Thus, the Wilson court should have found
107. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other ground, 416 U.S. 932

(1974). For other cases rejecting the standard of indispensability, see Teterud v. Burns, 522
F.2d 357, 359-60(8th Cir. 1975); Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D. D.C.
1976).
108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
109. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
110. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 740.
111. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. at 1257.
112. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404-05.
113. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
114. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).

115. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. at 3074.
116. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 744.
117. Id at 745.
118. Id at 738.
119. Id.

120. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
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a belief rooted in religion, determined that the belief was indirectly impeded, and proceeded to analyze whether a compelling governmental interest existed.
A government interest may overcome a free exercise claim if it is
compelling."' But only interests of the highest
order, and those not other122
wise served, can outweigh such a claim.
The United States Forest Service has a statutory interest in multiple
use of public lands. 123 Yet the statute allows the Forest Service to consider the relative values of the resources, not only to emphasize those that
provide the greatest economic return.'2 4 The interests of the United States
in multiple use of its lands are not tied solely to development of the Snow
Bowl. Forestalling expansion of the ski area in order to accomodate
another use does not damage the government's interest. Thus, the Snow
Bowl development is not a compelling interest.
Even if this interest is compelling, the statutory policy must be administered in its least restrictive manner.'25 In Wilson, two alternatives,
to remove existing facilities or to continue operation of the ski area at
a minimum level of development, were consonant with the Indians'
religions. 12 6 The Forest Service had the statutory discretion to implement
either option. By not exercising its discretion, the Forest Service failed
to administer public lands in a manner which least burdens the free exercise of religion.
The federal courts in the line of cases from Sequoyah to Wilson applied a standard to Indian free exercise claims which is harsh and inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Several factors explain the use of this more stringent standard. First, the courts may
be reluctant to expand litigation on this issue. The Constitution gives Congress the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States. 1 7 Congress
mandated multiple use of public land."8 To hold public land uses violative
of the first amendment embroils the courts in land management policies
which are more properly left to Congress and the interested regulatory
agencies. The court in Wilson, however, recognized that public land
management must not offend the Constitution. 2 9 The courts do have a
role when public land management abridges religious freedom, and the
possibility of a floodgate of litigation is inadequate justification for a
miserly interpretation of constitutional rights. Second, the facts in Wilson
cut against the Indians' claims. The ski area was developed forty-six years
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1982).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. at 718.
Hopi Brief, supra note 2, at 12.
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

128. 16 U.S.C. § 529.
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before the case reached the court of appeals, and the mountain had been
used for other commercial purposes for at least thirty years.' The court
probably felt that the Indians' failure to object to these uses weakened
their religious claims. Viewed from a traditional Judeo-Christian perspective, this inference may be valid. The Indians point out, however, that
it was impossible for them to raise these claims at the time the ski area
was first developed.' 3 1 Further, given that the sincerity of the Indians'
belief that the mountain was a living deity was stipulated, the court should
not have based its decision on the value-laden inference that the Indians'
religion was reduceable to practices which could be conducted at one site
and in one manner. The logical result of this theological judgment is that
government may impede the free exercise of religion as long as it does
not disturb mere visible forms of worship.
Plaintiffs should be required to establish that their use of the land
is rooted in religion and that the government's proposed use has a coercive effect which substantially burdens the free exercise of religion either
directly, by denying Indians access to a site, for example, or indirectly,
by impeding the observance of their religion. Upon such a showing, government is required to demonstrate that its interest is compelling and no less
restrictive means are available to manage the land in question. The first
amendment protects all religious practices, not merely those which can
be performed only at one site.
RICHARD SCHNEEBECK

130. Id at 745 n.6.
131. Hopi Brief, supra note 2, at 26.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

11

